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Abstract
We present a leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding. We show
that under certain conditions, co-branding that links unknown ￿rms in a new sector
with established ￿rms in a mature sector allows the unknown ￿rms to signal a high
product quality and establish their own reputation. We compare this situation
with a benchmark in which both sectors are new and ￿rms signal their quality
only with prices. We investigate how this comparison is aﬀected by the nature of
the technology linking the two sectors and a cross-sector inference problem that
consumers might face in identifying the true cause of product failure. We ￿nd that
co-branding facilitates the process in which a ￿rm in the new sector to signal its
product quality only if the co-branding sectors produce complementary inputs and
consumers face a cross-sector inference problem. We apply our insight to economics
of superstars, multinational ￿rms and co-authorship.
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This paper considers an adverse selection model in which we analyze how the reputation
of one ￿rm can be transferred to another that sells a diﬀerent product. More speci￿cally,
we consider a situation that there are two sectors in an economy. One sector is mature
in that ￿rms in that sector have already established their reputation and consumers are
informed about the quality of their products. The other sector is new and hence ￿rms
in that sector have yet to establish their reputation. The question we ask in this context
is whether there exists a mechanism to leverage reputation from the ￿rms in the mature
sector to the ones in the new sector.
In our model, the mechanism through which such leveraging of reputation takes place
is co-branding. We show that there exist conditions under which being associated with
a good brand in the mature sector allows a ￿rm in the new sector to signal a high quality
product and establish their own reputation. We compare this situation with a benchmark
in which both sectors are new. In both cases, reputation building is modelled in terms of
signaling. In the benchmark case where both sectors are new, we investigate the condition
under which there exists a separating equilibrium with prices being the instrument of
signaling. In the former case where one sector is mature, we study the condition to have
a separating equilibrium with co-branding. We say that there exists complementarity in
reputation building if the condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium is more
relaxed with co-branding. We investigate how this comparison is aﬀected by the nature of
the technology linking the two sectors (i.e. whether components produced by both sectors
are complementary or not) and a cross-sector inference problem that consumers might face
in identifying the true cause of product failure. We ￿nd that co-branding facilitates the
process in which a ￿rm in the new sector to signal its product quality if and only if
the co-branding sectors produce complementary inputs and consumers face a cross-sector
inference problem. Compared to the benchmark case in which both sectors are new and
hence no ￿rm has yet established its reputation, the fact that the economy has one mature
sector helps ￿rms in the new sector to build their reputation. Thus, complementarity in
technological relationship between the two sectors induces complementarity in reputation
building only if the cross-sector inference problem exists. We apply our insight to the
role of movie stars in the motion picture industries, co-branding of global brands by
multinational ￿rms and local brands in brand transitions, and co-authorship between
established scholars and young scholars.
Co-branding is an extensively used marketing strategy that is especially popular in
2introducing new consumer products.1 It is typically de￿ned as ￿pairing of two or more
branded products (constituent brands) to form a separate and unique product (compos-
ite brand).￿2 The marketing literature points out that co-branding plays a key role in
changing consumers￿ perception that the two constituent products will be regarded as
being similar quality. Thus, linking with a well-known brand through co-branding can
be a particularly eﬀective strategy for an unknown brand in increasing assimilation in
the eyes of consumers (Abratt ad Motlana, 2002). Rao, Qu, and Ruekert (1999), for
instance, suggest that when an unknown brand cannot eﬀectively signal its high quality,
co-branding with a well-known brand of high quality can be an eﬀective way to enter a
new market. The marketing literature, however, does not model the mechanism through
which the reputation of one brand can be leveraged to build reputation of another ￿rm￿s
brand. They rely either on case studies or experimental tests of hypothesis they posit
without any rigorous micro-foundation. Our paper complements the marketing literature
by providing a theoretical model that analyzes the mechanism through which the leverage
of reputation takes place.
Our paper is closely related to Tadelis (1999) and Cabral (2000). Tadelis studies name
trade in an adverse selection framework with overlapping generations of ￿rms.3 Cabral
applies Tadelis￿ framework to the issue of brand extension.4,5 We extend Tadelis￿ frame-
work to multiple sectors and study how ￿r m sw i t he s t a b l i s h e dn a m e s( o rb r a n d s )i no n e
sector may aﬀect the ability of ￿rms in the other sector to build their own reputation. In
particular, we ￿nd that complementarity in reputation building is related to complemen-
tarity in underlying technology and consumers￿ inference problems concerning the cause
of failure. Our focus thus is on name trading between contemporaneous ￿rms in diﬀerent
s e c t o r s ,i n s t e a do fn a m et r a d i n gb e t w e e nd i ﬀerent generations of ￿rms within the same
1Simonin and Ruth (1998) report that co-branding activities broadly de￿ned have increased with an
annual growth rate of 40% in the US.
2Washburn, Till and Priluck (2000), p. 591.
3The ￿rst paper on name trades is Kreps (1990) in a moral hazard setting with repeated games.
4Choi (1998) studies brand extension in a model of in￿nite horizon in which a ￿rm can launch a new
product every period. An equilibrium in which the ￿rm extends its brand only to products of high quality
is sustained by the threat of a breakdown of trust in case a low quality product is sold under the same
brand.
5Thal (2007) studies brand extension through licensing in an adverse selection framework similar to
Cabral (2000). In her model, there are two ￿rms: an incumbent who produces an old product under a
brand name and an innovator who launches a new product. The incumbent decides whether to license its
brand to the innovator. In contrast, in Cabral (2000), both the old and the new products are produced
by the incumbent. Both papers, however, assume that prices are equal to consumers￿ willingness to pay
whereas we allow that prices are used as a signaling device.
3sector as in Tadelis (1999). Another important distinction is that Tadelis and Cabral
abstract from the possibility of signaling through price by assuming that prices are equal
to the consumers￿ willingness to pay. In contrast, we allow for the possibility of signaling
through price in our benchmark and compare it to signaling via co-branding.
The special case of single component products in our model is similar to Bagwell and
Staiger (1989) who study export subsidy as a strategic trade policy to overcome informa-
tion barrier to entry. Major diﬀerences are that we study matches among ￿rms producing
complementary inputs and name trades between diﬀerent sectors. In addition, their model
assumes that once a consumer is matched to a ￿rm, the relationship is maintained for
both periods while the relationship is short-lived in our model. This diﬀerence arises since
we need to entertain the possibility that ￿rms change their partners based on the newly
revealed information about the product outcomes realized in the ￿rst period, which they
do not need to consider.
Bar-Isaac (forthcoming) develops a theory of reputation in teams to explain organi-
zational design of many professional service providers such as law ￿rms, consulting ￿rms,
and medical practices where reputation both at the level of the ￿rm and the individual
are crucial. He shows how a partnership structure where a senior works with a junior in
tandem provides proper incentives for both senior and junior to work hard: the junior￿s
incentives arise from a concern for her own reputation whereas the senior￿s incentives arise
from a concern for the reputation of her ￿rm which she plans to sell out to the junior.
His model employs a joint production technology that is similar to ours in the following
sense: individual outputs of a senior and a junior cannot be observed and only combined
output of a team of senior and junior is observable. This non-observability of individual
contribution in joint production is crucial to his main results and is akin to our assump-
tion that consumers cannot infer the true cause of failure when the ￿nal product fails
to perform. The incentive problem in his paper is mainly of moral hazard while we are
mainly concerned with adverse selection problem. As such, Bar-Isaac￿s and our papers
complement each other.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the economics of superstars (Rosen 1981
and MacDonald 1988), and in particular to Kremer (1993) who studies how the return
to talent is aﬀected by technological complementarity and matching. Kremer, however,
studies a situation in which agents￿s types (skill) are common knowledge while our focus
is on complementarity in reputation building with the types of ￿rms at least in one sector
being imperfect information to consumers. We identify a premium to established names
(or superstars) accruing from the ability to allow other complementary inputs to signal
4their quality through matching.
In Section 2, we present the basic model of adverse selection with complementary
components. To highlight the importance of technological complementarity, in section 3
we study the case of single component product as a benchmark. We compare two potential
instruments for establishing reputation: signaling with prices and signaling with name
trades. We ￿nd that conditions under which a signaling equilibrium exits are identical in
both cases. This result suggests that there is no complementarity in reputation building
in the absence of technological complementarity between name traders. What matters
for signaling is each type￿s gain from building reputation (i.e. from being recognized as a
high type in our model). Since the gain does not depend on the mode of signaling, the
condition to have a separating equilibrium is invariant to the mode of signaling.
Section 4 studies the case of complementary components. In order to investigate the
possibility that the reputation of ￿rms in one component sector can be leveraged to build
reputation of other ￿rms in the complementary sector, we consider two scenarios. In the
￿rst scenario, both sectors are new and ￿rms in neither sector established reputation (i.e.
no ￿rm￿s type is known to consumers). In the second scenario, information structure is
asymmetric across sectors: one sector is mature and ￿rms in that sector have already
established reputation (i.e. their types are known) whereas the complementary sector is
new and no ￿rm has established reputation. We show that in the absence of consumers￿
inference problem concerning the true cause of failure, co-branding is irrelevant in relaxing
the condition for the existence of separating equilibrium. However, if consumers are unable
to identify the true cause of failure, that is, when the ￿nal product composed of comple-
mentary components fails consumers are unable to tell which component is responsible
for the failure, co-branding can alleviate the adverse selection problem.
In the absence of the cross-sector inference problem, it turns out that the total gain
from building reputation (or from masquerading as a pair of high types) for any pair of
matched types producing complementary components is equal to the sum of each type￿s
stand-alone gain from building reputation. Therefore, a separating equilibrium in which
only a pair of high type ￿rms produce exists, regardless of the mode of signaling, as long
as a high-type￿s stand-alone gain from building reputation is larger than a low type￿s one.
This is similar to what happens in the case of single component product. In the presence
of the cross-sector inference problem, when a ￿rm owning a good brand chooses a low
type ￿rm as its partner, it suﬀers from a negative feedback eﬀect on its reputation. A low
type ￿rm is likely to produce a bad component and therefore the ￿nal product produced
together with a low type is likely to fail. Since consumers are unable to identify which
5component caused the failure of the ￿nal product, a good brand is likely to acquire a
failure track record at the end of period one. This negative feedback eﬀect facilitates
signaling through co-branding since a ￿rm having a good brand has little incentive to
choose a low type ￿rm as its partner. In contrast, when signaling is done with prices in
the benchmark of two new sectors, a pair of low type ￿rms can masquerade as a pair of
high type ￿rms by charging the same introductory price as the latter. Since a low type
￿rm is less likely to produce a good component than a high type ￿rm, the former suﬀers
less from the negative feedback eﬀect than the latter when each of them is matched with
al o wt y p e￿rm: this is obvious when a low type ￿rm produces a bad quality component
for sure. Therefore, preventing a pair of low types ￿rms from masquerading as a pair of
high types ￿rms can be more diﬃcult than preventing a pair of high type and low type
￿rms from masquerading. This explains why co-branding relaxes the condition to have a
separating equilibrium. In Section 5, we apply our insight to diﬀerent contexts.
2 The Model with Complementary Components
We consider a ￿nal product that requires two complementary components, x and y,t o
provide useful services to consumers.6 There is a continuum of ￿rms producing component
x whose mass is normalized to 1. There is another mass 1 of ￿rms producing component y.
We consider a two period model in which ￿rms live for two periods. Each ￿rm can produce
at most one unit of component output in each period. Consumers are homogeneous in
their willingness to pay for the ￿nal product and their mass is assumed to be more than
1 in each period. This assumption implies that the sellers are on the short side of the
market.
The realization of the quality of each component produced is uncertain; it can be either
good or bad. In our model, the complementarity of the two components means that the
weakest-link principle prevails in the determination of the ￿nal product￿s quality, that is,
the quality of the ￿nal product is determined by the lowest quality component. More
speci￿cally, we assume that the ￿nal product is successful (denoted by S) in rendering
useful service if and only if both components are of good quality. In such a case, the
value of service provided by the ￿nal product is normalized to 1. If at least one of the
components is of bad quality, the ￿nal product fails to provide any service to consumers
(denoted by F) and the product is of zero value.
One implication of the complementary components is that when the ￿nal product fails,
6We can extend the model to the case of more than two complementary inputs (n> 2).
6consumers may not be able to identify the true cause of failure due to the technological
sophistication of the product, i.e., whether it is due to the bad quality of component x,
y, or both components. We consider two cases depending on the ability of consumers
to identify the true cause of failure. We ￿rst analyze the information structure in which
consumers do not have any inference problem concerning the cause of failure. We then
investigate the case where consumers are unable to identify the true cause of failure and
explore the implications of such inference problem. Firms, however, are assumed to
know the true cause of failure and this information is shared among all the ￿rms. The
assumption that ￿rms have no inference problem is innocuous and simply allows us to
focus on the most eﬃcient outcome through ￿rms￿ rematch in the second period. This
assumption re￿ects the fact that ￿rms are better informed than consumers due to their
experience in production and superiority in technical knowledge.7
Firms diﬀer in their ability to produce a good quality component. Let θ
j
i represent the
type of ￿rm i ∈ [0,1] that produces component j,w h e r ej = x,y. We assume that there
are two types of ￿rms, high (H)a n dl o w( L)i ne a c hs e c t o r ,t h a ti s ,θ
j
i ∈ {H,L}.I f a ￿rm
is of high type (resp. of low type), in period one it can produce a good quality component
with probability qH (resp. qL) and a bad quality component with probability (1 − qH)
(resp. 1−qL)w h e r e1 >q H >q L ≥ 0. The per-period unit cost of producing a component
is given by cH and cL for high and low type ￿rms, respectively. The proportion of high
type ￿rms in sector j is given by νj ∈ (0,1). The quality realization of each component
given each ￿rm￿s type is i.i.d. Each ￿rm knows its own type while consumers only know
the distribution of types. In addition, we assume that all ￿rms know each other￿s type.
Our focus is on imperfect information on the consumer side. This assumption is meant
to re￿ect the fact that ￿rms are able to discern the capability of other ￿rms better than
consumers by virtue of being in the same line of business.8
We assume that the ￿rst period outcomes of each ￿nal product (S or F)b e c o m ek n o w n
to all ￿rms and consumers. Furthermore, we assume that there is some technological
learning for the ￿rms from their ￿r s tp e r i o dm a r k e tp r o d u c t i o n . M o r es p e c i ￿cally, each
￿rm￿s probability of making a good quality component in period two depends both on its
7Levin and Tadelis (2005) makes a similar assumption in their model of partnerships. More speci￿cally,
they consider industries where human capital plays an important role in determining product quality.
They assume that clients are at a disadvantage relative to ￿rms in assessing the ability of employees.
8Biglaiser (1993) makes a similar assumption in his model of middlemen as experts. A middleman is
a s s u m e dt ob ea b l et oa s c e r t a i nt h eq u a l i t yo ft h eg o od through his investment in human capital such as
education or apprenticeships whereas such investment is costly enough so that no buyer is would gain by
making an investment.
7t y p ea n do nt h eq u a l i t yo fi t sc o m p o n e n ti np e r i o do n e . T or e ￿ect this path dependency,





θF, respectively, depending on whether its component was of good quality with
successful performance or of bad quality with failed performance in the ￿rst period, where
θ = H,L and j = x,y. For simplicity, we assume qx
θS = q
y




Furthermore, the symmetry in technology allows us to isolate the eﬀect of the cross-sector
i n f e r e n c ep r o b l e m . W ea s s u m et h a tf o re a c ht y p eo f￿rms the probability of producing
a good component is higher when they produced a good component in period one than
otherwise, that is,
1 ≥ qθS >q θF ≥ 0 for θ = H,L.
The role of this assumption is to introduce some residual uncertainty about ￿rms￿ types
in our adverse selection model. As is usual in the literature on reputation, without such
an uncertainty, there is no reputation in stake and hence it is impossible to leverage
reputation. For instance, a component in period two can be an upgrade of the component
produced in period one. In such a case, not only the ￿rm￿s intrinsic ability (the type) but
also its ability speci￿c to the component produced in period one (the past performance)
c a nb ear e l e v a n tf a c t o r . I nt h ee x t r e m ec a s ew h e r ee a c h￿rm produces exactly the
same component each period, we can even imagine a situation of perfect inter-temporal
correlation of quality where θ is no longer relevant for the second period quality. The
opposite extreme case would be a situation in which the component produced in period
2 is completely diﬀerent from the component produced in period one. As a result,
the experience in the ￿rst period production is irrelevant and only θ matters for quality
determination in the second period. If a ￿rm￿s component was not experimented in




θN = qθN for θ = H,L with qθN <q θF. This inequality means that a ￿rm that
does not produce in period one is penalized since it does not acquire experience useful for
period two production. For instance, we can imagine a situation in which ￿rms￿ capability
depreciates over time without any production. The role of this assumption is to eliminate
the possibility that a high type that established its reputation through signaling in period
1 prefers as its period two partner a high type who did not produce in period one to a
high type that has a failure record. Let δ denote the discount factor for the second period
payoﬀs ,w h i c hi sc o m m o nf o ra l lt h ep l a y e r s .
To demonstrate the role of co-branding as a mechanism to leverage an established
￿rm￿s reputation, we consider two scenarios. First, as a benchmark, we consider a case
where both sectors are new and types of ￿rms in neither sector are known to consumers.
8This case captures a situation in which no ￿rm has yet established its reputation at the
beginning of the game. Second, we analyze the case of one-mature-one-new-sector in
which types of ￿rms in one sector (x) are already known (hence, a high type ￿rm in
sector x is a ￿rm having a good brand) whereas types of ￿rms in the complementary
sector (y) are not. This case represents a situation in which ￿rms producing component x
have already established their reputation while ￿rms producing component y have yet to
establish their reputation. To focus on the situation in which good brands are scare, we
assume νx < νy.9 We compare the two cases to derive conditions under which co-branding
can play a role in transmitting information about the quality of unknown ￿rms.
Concerning the determination of prices in the market, we consider the following match-
ing technology and bargaining game. In each period there is a random match between
au n i to f￿nal product and a buyer. The sellers are on the short side. As a result, we
assume that the sellers of the ￿nal product choose a price and make a take-or-leave-it
oﬀer. In particular, this provides the sellers with the possibility to signal their types. In
contrast, if we assume that consumers bid up the price of each ￿nal product until the
price is equalized to the consumers￿ willingness to pay as in Tadelis (1999) and Cabral
(2000), no signaling through price is possible. Since we are interested in how the fact
that ￿rms producing one component (x) have established reputation aﬀects the ability
of ￿rms producing the complementary component (y) to signal their types, we consider
a game in which ￿rms can signal their types through prices. We will compare signaling
through prices in the benchmark of two new sectors with signaling through co-branding
in the case of one-mature-one-new-sector.
In summary, we make the following assumptions.
A1: (Information Structure) Firms know each other￿s types. In the case of two new
sectors, consumers do not know ￿rm￿s type in neither sector. In the case of one-mature-
one-new-sector, they know the types of ￿rms producing component x while they do not
know the types of ￿rms producing component y.
A2: (With or Without Inference Problem Concerning the Cause of Failure) In the
presence of the inference problem, if a ￿nal product fails, consumers do not know whether
it is due to the failure in component x or y (or due to both). However, ￿rms have no such
inference problem.
A3: (Incomplete and Short-Term Contracts) Although the outcomes of each ￿nal
product realized in period one become known to every player, ￿rms cannot use a contract
9Our proof can be easily adapted to show that our main result extends to the case of νx = νy as well.
9contingent on the realized outcomes. Firms cannot use a long-term contract. This is true
for among themselves and with respect to consumers.
A3 is a standard assumption in the incomplete contract literature a la Hart-Grossman-
Moore, which is also adopted by Tadelis (1999), Cabral (2000) and Bar-Issac (forthcom-
ing).10 The inability to write contingent contracts can be justi￿ed by the problems of
veri￿ability in courts. If outcomes are contractible, ￿rms can use a long-term contract
that speci￿es period two actions contingent on period one outcomes. Because of the
incompleteness of contracts, it is natural to consider short-term contracts.
A4: (i) (qH)
2 − 2cH > 0 > max
n
(qL)
2 − 2cL,q HqL − cH − cL
o
(ii) qHFqHF − 2cH > 0 > max{qLSqLS − 2cL,max{qHSqLS,q LSqHS} − cH − cL}
A4 implies that it is socially desirable for a pair of high type ￿rms to produce in each
period while it is socially undesirable for any pair that involves a low type ￿rm to produce
in any period. This assumption allows us to focus on the separating equilibrium in which
only pairs of high type ￿rms produce.
The timing in the case of two new sectors where ￿rm types in neither sector is known
to consumers is given as follows:
￿ In period one
1. Firms producing each component search for partners in the complementary sector
with each ￿rm producing component x being matched to a ￿rm producing component y.
2. After matching each pair of matched ￿rms decide whether or not to produce each
component (and hence a unit of ￿nal product). The production takes place only when
both parties agree. Otherwise, they continue to search until a suitable match partner is
found. Upon producing a ￿nal product, each ￿rm chooses a name to attach to the ￿nal
product.
3. Each ￿nal product is randomly matched to a consumer. Each pair of ￿rms choose
a price for the ￿nal product and makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the consumer. Each
consumer decides whether to accept or reject the oﬀer. In case the consumer rejects it,
no trade is realized in period one.
4. The outcome of each product is realized and known to all ￿rms and all consumers.
Therefore at the end of period one, each ￿rm￿s name is associated with S or F.
10See Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) for details.
10￿ In period two
1. There will be a new match between ￿rms producing components x and y.T h e
match will be based on the information about each ￿rm￿s type and each ￿rm￿s past record
(the record perceived by consumers and the true record known by ￿rms).
2. Given a pair of matched ￿rms, they decide whether or not to produce each com-
ponent (and hence a unit of ￿nal product). Upon producing a ￿nal product, each ￿rm
chooses a name (its old name or a new name) and attaches it to the ￿nal product.
3. Each ￿nal product is matched to a consumer. Each pair of ￿rms choose a price
and makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the consumer. Each consumer decides whether to
accept or reject the oﬀer. In case the consumer rejects it, there is no trade as in the ￿rst
period.
4. The outcome of each product is realized.
We assume that the match among ￿rms takes place on voluntary basis in that the
match will be materialized only when both parties wish to be matched with the other.
We also assume that the matching process is instantaneous and does not entail any search
costs.
In what follows, we ￿rst study a benchmark in which each component j(= x,y) is
a ￿nal product that can be consumed independently of each other. This benchmark
allows us to isolate the eﬀect of having technological complementarity, as is assumed in
our model. In all our analysis, we focus on separating equilibria. When there are multiple
equilibria, we apply the Cho-Kreps (1987) criterion to eliminate unreasonable equilibria.
3 Benchmark: Single component product
In this benchmark, we consider the case of the single component product. Each component
j(= x,y) can be consumed as an independent ￿nal product and there is no technological
complementarity between them. As a consequence, there is no inference problem con-
cerning the cause of failure on the part of consumers when a product fails. We below
consider two cases. In the ￿rst case, there is no established name in the economy. In the
second case, there are some established names in the economy and hence ￿rms in sector j
can buy the established names to signal their types. Since each product can be analyzed
separately, for notational simplicity, we will dispense with the superscript j in this section
if there is no ambiguity. We modify A4 to the single component product case as follows:
A4￿: (i) qH >c H >c L >q L (ii) qHF >c H >c L >q LS
113.1 Price as a Signal without Name Trades
Consider ￿rst the case in which the mean to signal one￿s type is the price chosen in period
one. From A4￿, in any separating equilibrium, only high type ￿rms sell their products
while low type ￿rms do not. Let pS
1H be the price that high type ￿rms choose in period
one where the superscript S means ￿single component good￿. Obviously, the revised
posterior belief of consumers ν(pS
1H) is equal to 1 in a separating equilibrium. In addition,
let pS
2S and pS
2F respectively denote the price that high type ￿rms with the ￿rst period
track record of S and F charge in period two. Since ￿rms have bargaining power with






The suﬃcient and necessary conditions to have a separating equilibrium in which only
































The ￿rst two conditions are incentive compatibility constraints for low type ￿rms.
Condition (ICS
L- 1 )s a y st h a tal o wt y p e￿rm has no incentive to sell in period 1 and
exit from the market in period 2. Condition (ICS
L- 2 )s a y st h a tal o wt y p e￿rm has no
incentive to mimic a high type ￿rm in both periods either. Condition (ICS
H)i si n c e n t i v e
compatibility constraint for high type ￿rms. Since p∗
2F >c H from A4￿(ii), (ICS
L-1) is
satis￿ed if (ICS
L-2) holds. For condition (ICS
L-2) to hold, we need to have pS
1H ≤ cL −
δ [qLqHS +( 1− qL)qHF − cL] whereas the condition for (ICS
H) can be rewritten as pS
1H ≥
cH − δ [qHqHS +( 1− qH)qHF − cH]. For these two conditions to be compatible, it is
required that
cH − δ[qHqHS +( 1− qH)qHF − cH] ≤ cL − δ [qLqHS +( 1− qL)qHF − cL],







(qH − qL)(qHS − qHF) − (cH − cL)
.
12This implies that when the condition above holds, any pS
1H ∈ [cH−δ[qHqHS+(1−qH)qHF−
cH], cL − δ[qLqHS +( 1− qL)qHF − cL]] also satis￿es condition (ICS
L-1)11 and thus can be
supported as a separating equilibrium with the belief ν(pS
1H)=1and ν(p1)=0for all
p1 6= pS
1H. Among the continuum of equilibria, the only one surviving the Cho-Kreps
(1987) re￿nement is pS∗
1H ≡ cL−δ [qLqHS +( 1− qL)qHF − cL]. To show this, suppose that
in equilibrium high type ￿rms are supposed to choose p1H belonging to the interval but
diﬀerent from p∗
1H. Then, high type ￿rms can deviate and choose a price of (pS
1H + †),
where † is an in￿nitesimally small positive number. Since this new price is equilibrium
dominated for low type ￿rms, consumers should believe that this price is chosen by a
high type ￿rm. Thus, high type ￿rms can pro￿tably deviate upsetting the putative
equilibrium. Thus, the only reasonable separating equilibrium price in the ￿rst period
is pS∗
1H ≡ cL − δ [qLqHS +( 1− qL)qHF − cL].
Summarizing our results so far, we have:
Proposition 1 In the benchmark case of single component product without name trades;
(i). A separating equilibrium exists if and only if cH − cL < (qH − qL)(qHS − qHF)
holds and δ ≥ δ
S∗ where δ




(qH − qL)(qHS − qHF) − (cH − cL)
.
(ii). When the above condition holds, the only ￿rst-period price surviving Cho-Kreps
criteria is pS∗
1H ≡ (1 + δ)cL − δ [qLqHS +( 1− qL)qHF](<c L) and the second period price
is always uniquely given by p∗
2S = qHS,p ∗
2F = qHF.
Note that if qHS = qHF, there is no separating equilibrium. In other words, a necessary
condition to have a separating equilibrium in our model is that a successful performance
in period one is appreciated by consumers even though a ￿rm￿s type is known to be high.
Note also that high type ￿rms make a loss in period 1 since the ￿rst period equilibrium
price pS∗
1H is less than its cost of cH to signal their type (i.e., pS∗
1H <c L <c H). Therefore,
a separating equilibrium exists only if the second period pro￿t for high type ￿rms is
suﬃciently large to recoup its loss in the ￿rst period.






1H)) represent a high type￿s (resp. a low type￿s) gain from being recognized as
ah i g ht y p e .I no t h e rw o r d s ,πS
H(pS




is equal to the left hand side of (ICS
L-2).
11This comes form the fact that qLqHS +( 1− qL)qHF >c L.
133.2 Name trades
In this subsection we allow the possibility of name trades as in Tadelis (1999) and investi-
gate whether such a possibility helps in establishing reputation of ￿rms of unknown type.
Suppose now that there is a mass νj (or smaller than νj)o fg o o db r a n dn a m e si nt h e
economy. Hence, ￿rms in sector j can purchase a good name to signal their type.12 We
assume that there is unlimited supply of bad brand names and furthermore any ￿rm can
introduce a new name without any cost. Each brand name can be sold at most to one
￿rm in sector j. We formally study how the possibility of buying an existing brand name
aﬀects the condition to have a separating equilibrium. In particular, we are interested in
the equilibrium in which the ￿rst period belief about the type depends only on whether
the brand name is good, bad, or new. In a separating equilibrium, a high type ￿rm buys
a good brand name to be attached to its product: i.e. the revised priors are ν(G)=1
and ν(B)=ν(N)=0where G represents a good brand name, B represents a bad brand
name and N represents a new name. In such an equilibrium, low type ￿rms cannot sell
their products and high type ￿rms can sell their products at prices pS∗∗
1H = qH.W h e n
only high type ￿rms sell in the ￿rst period, the second period prices with the track record
of success and failure are respectively given by pS∗∗
2S = qHS(= pS∗
2S), pS∗∗
2F = qHF(= pS∗
2F) as
in section 3.1.
This implies that a high type ￿rm￿s maximum willingness to pay for a good brand





























A separating equilibrium in which only high types buy good names exists if and only
if bS∗∗
H ≥ bS∗∗
L , which is equivalent to cH − cL < (qH − qL)(qHS − qHF) and δ ≥ δ
S∗.
Therefore, we conclude
Proposition 2 (i). Consider the benchmark of single component product. Suppose that
there is a mass νj (or smaller than vj) of good names in the economy and unlimited supply
of bad names.
12Either we can assume that a ￿rm buys a name for two periods or a ￿rm buys a name only for the
￿rst period but at the same time attaches his own name with the bought name such that he can use his
o w nn a m ef o rt h es e c o n dp e r i o d .
14a. The possibility to buy name does not aﬀect the condition to have a separating
equilibrium.
b. In any separating equilibrium, the ￿rst-period price is p∗∗
1H = qH >p ∗
1H while the
second period prices are as in proposition 1 p∗∗
2S = p∗
2S = qHS,p ∗∗
2F = p∗
2F = qHF.
(ii). Therefore, in the absence of technological complementarity, there is no comple-
mentarity in reputation building.
Proposition 2(ii) allows us to conclude that in the absence of technological comple-
mentarity, having established names in one sector does not help ￿rms in another sector to
build their reputations and therefore there is no complementarity in reputation building.














This shows that given pS∗∗
1H , each type￿s gain from building reputation is not aﬀected by
the mode of signaling. Furthermore, what matters for the possibility of signaling is the





is independent of pS
1H. Therefore, the mode of signaling does not aﬀect the condition under
which a signaling equilibrium exists.
Remark 1: The result of proposition 2 seems to be a little bit puzzling. In some
c a s e s ,b u y i n gag o o dn a m es e e m st ob eam o r ee ﬀective way of signaling than signaling
through a low price. For instance, consider the market for perfumes. Many perfumes use
names of famous fashion designers as their own product names even though the fashion
designer in question has not designed neither the shape of the bottle nor its odor. In
reality, there can be some reasons which make the signaling through name more eﬀective
than signaling through low prices. First, if pS∗
1H < 0, charging a negative price can attract
fake consumers who do not value the product at all such that they just enjoy the free gift,
which would make signaling very costly. Second, when pS∗
1H > 0, a low price can trigger the
entry of really bad products. For instance, suppose that there is a large number of ￿rms
who can produce very bad quality product y a tav e r yl o wc o s ts u c ht h a tac o n s u m e r ￿ s
bene￿t from using that good is almost zero while the cost of producing it is lower than
pS∗
1H. Then, these ￿rms can make a positive pro￿t by entering the market at price pS∗
1H.B y
contrast, signaling through names does not suﬀer neither from fake consumers￿ seeking
for free gift nor from pooling with very bad quality products.
Remark 2: It is interesting to note diﬀerent price dynamics depending on the mode
of signaling. Since in our model, the quantity that a ￿rm produces each period is ￿xed,
15the diﬀerence in price dynamics does not aﬀect social welfare. In a richer model in
which quantity is endogenous, a high ￿rst period price under signaling with names would
generate lower consumer surplus than a low ￿rst period price under signaling with price.
4 Complementary Case with Two Sectors
We now consider the case in which a ￿nal product is composed of two complementary
components as described in the model. In this section, we investigate a mechanism in
which the reputation of ￿rms in one component sector can be leveraged to build reputation
of other ￿rms in the complementary sector. To investigate this issue, we consider two
scenarios. In the ￿rst scenario, both sectors are new and ￿rms in neither sector established
reputation. In the second scenario, information structure in asymmetric across sectors:
o n es e c t o ri sm a t u r ea n d￿rms in that sector have already established reputation whereas
the complementary sector is new and no ￿rm has established reputation.
In the ￿rst scenario, price is used to signal the quality of the ￿nal product. In the
second scenario, we ask the question of whether co-branding with established ￿rms can
be used as an alternative signal for ￿rms with unknown quality. We ￿nd that the answer
is aﬃrmative and derive conditions under which co-branding is a more eﬀective way to
signal quality than pricing alone. In particular, we highlight the importance of the
consumers￿ inference problem in identifying the true cause of failure when a ￿nal product
fails to perform. We show that co-branding has a bite as an instrument of signal when
consumers have the inference problem.
We are interested in a separating equilibrium in which the ￿rm types are revealed to
consumers through signaling. With our parametric assumption A4, this implies that only
high types are able to sell in the ￿rst period and all remaining ￿rms in the second period
are high types. As usual, we analyze the conditions for the existence of a separating
equilibrium by applying backward induction.
4.1 The Second Period
We focus on separating equilibrium in which ￿rm types are revealed to consumers. This
implies that only high types remain in the market and their types are known to consumers
in the second period. As a result, the second period analysis is the same, independent of
the mode of signaling used in the ￿rst period.
Regardless of the initial information structure across the sectors at the beginning of
16the game, both sectors are symmetric ex post in the beginning of second period in a
separating equilibrium in which only pairs of high type ￿rms produce in the ￿rst period.
Thus, we assume that in period two, revenue is equally divided within a pair of high type
￿rms with the same past record (perceived by consumers). We below show that there
exists an equilibrium with positive sorting in the second period. Note that in the second
period, every pair of ￿rms charges a price equal to a consumer￿s maximum willingness to
pay for the ￿nal product given his information about the ￿rms￿ types and their previous
records.
Consider ￿rst the case without consumers￿ inference problem, that is, consumers are
able to identify the true cause of the failure when the ￿nal product fails. Let p2N
SF denote
the prices charged by a pair composed of a high type in sector x with a success record
and a high type in sector y with a failure record: the superscript N means no inference
problem. We de￿ne p2N
SS, p2N
FS and p2N












With the assumption of the equal division of revenue within an SS pair (and within an
FF pair), the expected payoﬀ of a ￿rm with a success record (respectively, with a failure
record) under positive sorting is p2N
SS/2−cH (respectively, p2N
FF/2−cH). We now show that
positive sorting takes place as an equilibrium, that is, no ￿rm with a success record has
an incentive to be matched with a ￿rm with a failure record. Suppose, to the contrary,
that a ￿rm in sector x with a success record is matched with a ￿rm in sector y with a
failure record. In this case, their joint revenue is p2N
SF. For this deviation to be pro￿table,
their joint revenue (p2N




2 . However, we have
p
2N











This implies that such a deviation cannot be pro￿table for both parties; positive sorting
arises as an equilibrium outcome and no ￿rm with success record has incentives to be
m a t c h e dw i t ha￿rm with failure record in the second period.
Consider now the case with consumers￿ inference problem in that they cannot identify
the true cause of failure when a ￿nal product fails. Let p2I
SF denote the prices charged by a
pair composed of a high type in sector x with a success record and a high type in sector y




FF in a similar way. Obviously, we have p2I
SS =( qHS)
2 (= p2I
SS). We focus on the most
eﬃcient equilibrium in which among the ￿rms with a failure record (i.e. among those
17whose ￿nal products failed in the ￿rst period), the successful producers of component x
are matched with the successful producers of component y and similarly for the producers












The equal division of revenue within an SS pair (and within an FF pair) implies that
the expected payoﬀ of a ￿rm with a success record (respectively, with a failure record) is
p2I
SS/2−cH (respectively, p2I
FF/2−cH). Once again, we show that positive sorting arises as
an equilibrium. As in the case without the inference problem, let us consider a deviation
in which a ￿rm in sector x with success record is matched with a ￿rm in sector y with
failure record. If consumers expect that the ￿rm with a failure record is randomly chosen
for matching with a success record, their maximum willingness to pay for a ￿nal product













For the deviation to be pro￿table, their joint revenue (p2I
SF) should exceed that achievable

















































Therefore, such a deviation is not pro￿table and positive sorting with the same record is
an equilibrium.
4.2 The First Period
4.2.1 General result
We ￿rst derive a general result that holds regardless of the existence of consumers￿ infer-
ence problem.
Consider the ￿rst scenario in which both sectors are new and the instrument of sig-
naling is price. Suppose that a pair of high types charges p1
HH in the ￿rst period price in
a separating equilibrium. Given p1
HH,l e tV N
HH(p1
HH) denote the present discounted values
18of the total payoﬀst h a tap a i ro fh i g ht y p e sr e a l i z eo v e rt w op e r i o d si nas e p a r a t i n g
























The corresponding value in the presence of the inference problem is denoted by V I
HH(p1
HH),


























Note that in the presence of the inference problem, the ￿rms will be able to charge the
price p2I
SS in period two only if both components were successful in period one. To present
a result that holds regardless of the existence of the inference problem, we use superscript
h = N,I.
Similarly, given information structure h,l e tV h
HL(p1
HH) denote the present value of
total joint payoﬀst h a ta nHL pair (i.e., a pair composed of a high type in sector x and
a low type in sector y) realize over two periods when they masquerade as an HH pair
by charging p1
HH in period one. V h
LH(p1
HH) and V h
LL(p1
HH) are similarly de￿ned and by










































































SS +( 1− qHqL)p
2I
























Let us de￿ne ∆h
HH,HL ≡ V h
HH(p1
HH) − V h
HL(p1
HH), ∆h
HL,LL ≡ V h
HL(p1




HH,LL ≡ V h
HH(p1
HH) − V h
LL(p1






When signaling is done with prices, in order to have a separating equilibrium in which
only HH pairs produce in the ￿rst period, V h
HH(p1
HH) ≥ 0 and V h
LL(p1
HH) ≤ 0 must hold.
Furthermore, from νx < νy, there remain some high type ￿rms in sector y which cannot
be matched to high types in sector x.T h e s e￿rms can be matched to low types in sector
x. Therefore, V h
LH(p1
HH) ≤ 0 also must hold. We have the following lemma:
19Lemma 1 Consider signaling with prices when both sectors are new. For a given infor-




Proof. The previous argument shows that if the separating equilibrium exists, ∆h
HH,HL ≥
0 and ∆h
HH,LL ≥ 0 hold. We now prove the reverse part, that is, if the conditions
∆h
HH,HL ≥ 0 and ∆h
HH,LL ≥ 0 hold, there exists a separating equilibrium. Consider a
￿rst period ￿nal product price p1h∗
HH(≤ (qH)2) such that V h
HH(p1h∗
HH) ≥ 0, V h
LL(p1h∗
HH) ≤
0 and V h
HL(p1h∗
HH) ≤ 0. Note that such a p1h∗







HH) strictly increases in p1h∗
HH.L e t p1h∗
HH and p1h∗
HH be










HH)=0 , respectively. If
∆h
HH,HL ≥ 0 and ∆h
HH,LL ≥ 0 , then it is clear that p1h∗
HH ≥ p1h∗




HH] we have V h
HH(p1h∗
HH) ≥ 0, V h
LL(p1h∗
HH) ≤ 0 and V h
HL(p1h∗
HH) ≤ 0.T h e r e -
fore, we have a continuum of separating equilibria that can be supported with appropri-
ate beliefs if p1h∗
HH >p 1h∗
HH. However, the only equilibrium that survives the Cho-Kreps
re￿nement criterion is the equilibrium in which HH pairs charge p1h∗
HH = p1h∗











=0 , any pair including at least one low type
has no incentive to mimic the price charged by HH pairs. Competition among high type
￿rms in sector y to be matched with high type ￿rms in sector x aﬀects the revenue sharing
within an HH pair such that in any HH pair, the high type ￿rm in sector y gets zero pay-
oﬀ; if it realizes any strictly positive payoﬀ, then a high type ￿rm in sector y which is not
m a t c h e dt oah i g ht y p e￿rm in x can make a bid for a smaller payoﬀ to be matched with







HH) > 0 if p1h∗
HH >p 1h∗
HH), any high type in sector x has an incentive to be
matched with a high type ￿rm in sector y and to sell the ￿nal product at price p1h∗
HH = p1h∗
HH.
Consider now an alternative scenario in which sector x is mature and sector y is new.
We investigate the possibility that the existence of established ￿rms in sector x enables
new ￿rms in sector y to signal their quality with co-branding . In a separating equilibrium
with co-branding, no ￿rm can sell its product without being associated with good brands
in sector x. Since good brand names are relatively scarce (i.e. νx < νy), good brand
￿rms in sector x will have all bargaining power with respect to their partners in sector y,
implying that ￿rms in sector y will have zero payoﬀ.W eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gl e m m a :
Lemma 2 Consider signaling with co-branding when sector x is mature and sector y is
new. For a given information structure h = N or I, the separating equilibrium exists if
and only if ∆h
HH,HL ≥ 0.
20Proof. Suppose that the separating equilibrium exists. Then, an HH pair will charge in
period one p1h∗∗
HH =( qH)
2.S i n c eag o o db r a n d￿rm in sector x has all the bargaining power
with respect to its partner, it gets V h
HH(p1h∗∗
HH ) if it is matched with a high type in sector
y. Instead, if it deviates and is matched with a low type in sector y and charges p1h∗∗
HH ,
it gets V h
HL(p1h∗∗
HH ). For the separating equilibrium to exist, V h
HH(p1h∗∗




HH,HL ≥ 0 must hold.
Conversely, suppose that ∆h
HH,HL ≥ 0. Then, we have V h
HH(p1h∗∗





HH ). Therefore, the separating equilibrium with co-branding exists.
From both lemmas, we have the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 For a given information structure h = N or I, if the separating equilib-
rium with prices exists when both sectors are new, then the separating equilibrium with
co-branding exists when sector x is mature and sector y is new.
In order to provide an intuition about the result in the proposition, we ￿rst note that
regardless of the mode of signaling, νx < νy implies that a high type in sector x has
all bargaining power with respect to his partner from sector y. Under signaling with
co-branding, an HH pair will charge in period one p1h∗∗
HH =( qH)
2 and we always have
VHH(p1h∗∗
HH ) > 0. Therefore, the signaling equilibrium exists if and only if a high type in
sector x prefers being matched to a high type instead of being matched to a low type
and this condition is given by ∆h
HH,HL ≥ 0. In contrast, under signaling with prices, this
condition is only a necessary one since a low type in sector x can be matched either to a
high type or a low type in sector y to masquerade as an HH pair by charging the ￿rst
period price equal to p1∗
HH, the price charged by an HH pair. In order to make such a
deviation not pro￿table, we need an additional condition, that is, p1h∗
HH must be such that
V h
LH(p1h∗
HH) ≤ 0 and V h
LL(p1h∗
HH) ≤ 0 hold. These conditions and V h
HH(p1h∗
HH) ≥ 0 are satis￿ed
only if ∆h
HH,HL ≥ 0 and ∆h
HH,LL ≥ 0. In summary, under signaling with co-branding, low
type ￿rms in sector x cannot sell their products simply because their brands are known
to be of low quality. This relaxes the condition to have a separating equilibrium vis-a-vis
signaling with prices.
The proposition essentially says that the condition to have a separating equilibrium is
weakly less stringent under signaling with co-branding than under signalling with prices.
We now investigate when the condition for a separating equilibrium is strictly less strin-
gent under signaling with co-branding. We demonstrate that the incentive compatibility
condition ∆h
HH,LL ≥ 0 is a non-binding constraint under signaling with prices when con-
sumers do not have the inference problem. As a result, co-branding has no bite in the
21absence of the inference problem. However, the condition becomes a binding constraint
when consumers have the inference problem concerning the true cause of failure. In
such a case, co-branding strictly relaxes the condition for the existence of a separating
equilibrium and has the potential to be a more eﬀective instrument of signaling.
4.2.2 No inference problem
Suppose that there is no inference problem and consumers can identify the culprit of the
failure when the ￿nal product fails to perform. In such a case, the following lemma states
that the additional constraint under signaling with prices, ∆N
HH,LL ≥ 0, is redundant.























































































































HH,LL)=s i g n ( ∆N
HL,HL), that is, ∆N
HH,HL ≥ 0 if and only if ∆N
HH,LL ≥ 0.
As a consequence, we have the following proposition that states the equivalence between
signaling with prices and signaling with co-branding when the true cause of failure can
be identi￿ed by consumers when the ￿nal product fails to perform.
Proposition 4 In the absence of consumers￿ inference problem, technological complemen-
tarity does not imply complementarity in reputation building (i.e. the condition to have a
separating equilibrium does not depend on the mode of signaling). The condition for the
22existence of separating equilibrium (∆N
HH,LL =2 ∆N
HH,HL ≥ 0) can be stated equivalently









> (cH − cL)
and δ ≥ δ
N∗ ≡
cH − cL
AN∗ − (cH − cL)
.
In order to provide an intuition of the result of the above proposition, de￿ne the





















for θ = H,L.
πSA
θ represents a θ-type ￿rm￿s (expected) pro￿t when consumers believe that it is a high
type ￿rm. Then, a θθ
0











The equation tells that in the absence of the inference problem, the type of a ￿rm￿s partner














Hence, the mode of signaling is irrelevant for the existence of separating equilibrium.
The separating equilibrium exists as long as a high type￿s stand-alone gain from building
reputation is higher than that of a low type, which is the intuition we found in the previous
section on the single component product.
4.2.3 Inference problem
Suppose that consumers face an inference problem in that they cannot identify the true
cause of failure when the ￿nal product fails. In such a case, we demonstrate that co-
branding relaxes the condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium. In other
words, when one sector is mature and ￿rms in that sector have established reputation,
co-branding may allow ￿rms in the new sector signal the quality that they could not signal
with prices when both sectors are new. The following lemma shows that the additional
constraint under signaling with prices is more stringent than the one under signaling with
co-branding and thus can be a binding constraint in the presence of the inference problem.
13In the de￿nition, we assume equal sharing of the period one revenue for expositional facility; this
assumption is not needed for the arguments we make.







































SS +( 1− qHqL)p
2I































































The lemma implies that it is possible to have ∆I
HH,HL ≥ 0 and ∆I
HH,LL < 0 at the


















HL,LL < 0.A s a r e s u l t , w e c a n h a v e ∆I
HH,HL ≥ 0 and
∆I

































), we can rewrite the condition above in terms of primitive
parameters:


















Proposition 5 In the presence of consumers￿ inference problem, technological comple-
mentarity implies complementarity in reputation building (i.e. the condition to have a
24separating equilibrium is less stringent under signaling with co-branding than under sig-
naling with prices). More precisely, if the following inequality holds
















the separating equilibrium exists under signaling with co-branding but does not exist under
signaling with prices.
In order to provide an intuition of the result of the above proposition, consider the



















FF − cL − cL
o
.
Therefore, when cH >c L,w h i c hw ea s s u m e ,w eh a v eV I
LL >V I
HL. As a consequence,
satisfying ∆I
HH,LL = V I
HH − V I
LL ≥ 0 is more diﬃcult than satisfying ∆I
HH,HL = V I
HH −
V I
HL ≥ 0. This implies that signaling through prices is more diﬃcult than signaling
through co-branding. Intuitively, in the case of one-mature-one-new sectors, a good brand
￿rm in the mature sector has little incentive to choose as its partner a low type ￿rm in
the new sector because of the negative feed-back eﬀect on its reputation; when qL =0 ,
the ￿nal product produced together with a low type will fail for sure and therefore the
good brand￿s reputation will be sullied from a failure record. By contrast, in the case of
two new sectors, both an LL pair and an HL pair can masquerade as an HH pair by
charging price p1
HH.W h e nqL =0 ,a￿rm in an LL pair does not suﬀer from any negative
feedback on its reputation while the total cost of an LL pair is lower than that of an
HL pair. Therefore, preventing an LL pair from masquerading as an HH pair is more
diﬃcult than preventing an HL pair from masquerading as an HH pair, which implies
that co-branding relaxes the condition to have a separating equilibrium.
5 Applications
1. Movie Stars and Blockbusters in the Motion Picture Industry
We apply our model to the role movie stars play in the motion picture industry.
Motion pictures are an experience good whose quality can be only ascertained with con-
sumption. The ￿nal product also requires many complementary inputs, most important
of them are actors, directors, and scripts among other things. For an executive of a
25studio who has a project, it is essential to convince (i.e., signal) the quality of the project
to outsider ￿nanciers and ￿nal consumers to get the necessary funding for the project and
generate considerable grosses.
In addition, in the motion picture industry, it is a reasonable assumption that movie
stars and top directors are much more recognizable to ￿nanciers and ￿nal consumers than
other key complementary inputs such as scripts. Thus, the involvement of established
movie stars in a movie project may be associated with the high quality of other key
inputs, and thus overall quality of the movie. Ravid (1999), for instance, describes the
institutional details of the motion picture industry in which star participation can signal
superior information, that is, a star will commit to a project because he or she knows
that it is of high quality. According to Ravid (1999), we can view that the commitment
of move stars in an early stage of the project ￿signals the quality of the project to the
studio or to outside ￿nanciers (p. 465).￿
The empirical literature also corroborates the signaling hypothesis, suggesting that
the participation of a movie superstar acts as a signal of the quality of the project. For
instance, Albert (1998) ￿nds that stars serve as a signal or ￿markers￿ of ￿lm types and the
value of stars is partly due to their ability to signal the quality of ￿lms in a consistent and
predictable way.14 In addition, Chisholm (2004) ￿nds a strong support for the hypothesis
that the presence of stars plays a valuable role for studio executives ex ante even though
an established star does not ensure a successful ￿lm ex post, and hence her data are
consistent with the signaling hypothesis.
2. Multinationals and Outsourcing
Co-branding can be also used for a strategy to penetrate foreign markets by multi-
nationals. Abratt and Motlana￿s (2002) case studies of Danone, a French multinational
of yogurt manufacturer, and McCain Foods, a Canadian frozen food multinational, doc-
ument how these ￿rms penetrated into the South African market by co-branding with
￿well-known￿ local brands, Clover SA and Irvin and Johnson, respectively. These case
studies show how co-branding can be used in brand transitions.15 Our model may also
14According to Albert (1998), a superstar movie actor, ￿either through his talent, ability to choose, or
ability to acquire investment, is a marker of many successful ￿lms (p. 255).￿
15The example of Lenovo can be interpreted in a similar vein. When IBM sold its PC division to
China-based Lenovo Group and take a minority stake, the deal allowed Lenovo to use IBM￿s logo for ￿ve
years. After the sale, Lenovo marketed its PC with the brand name of ￿Lenovo IBM Thinkpad.￿ The
rationale behind the deal for Lenovo was believed to be that the co-branding arrangement helps Lenovo
expand in the global market where it is relatively unknown.
26shed some light on the rising activities in outsourcing we observe recently.16 Nike, for
instance, does most manufacturing activities through contractual arrangements with over-
see factories whereas the design and marketing of its products is conducted in the United
States. What distinguishes this kind of outsourcing activities from the purchase of any
other foreign products by American consumers is the use of outsourcing ￿rms￿ brand
names. Perhaps foreign producers may have a hard time in penetrating the American
market due to low recognition of their own brand names; American consumers may be re-
luctant to purchase foreign products with unknown brand names due to quality concerns.
In contrast, they are willing to buy Nike products with a high price even though they are
well aware that the actual manufacturing has been carried out by foreign manufacturers.
They trust that Nike knows the capability of foreign manufacturers better than they do
and the fact that Nike chose a particular foreign manufacturer certi￿es the capability of
the foreign producer.
3. Co-authorship with Established Scholars
The same intuition can be applied to co-authorship decisions in the academic market.
The currency in the academic market is recognition. Even though there is no monetary
price attached to academic work, we can interpret the amount of attention readers pay to
any particular work as its market price. When there are co-authors for a particular paper,
the quality of the paper depends on the quality of contributions by all authors. When
the quality of the paper is low, it may be diﬃcult for outside readers to ascertain who
is responsible for the quality. It is a reasonable assumption that potential collaborators
know each other￿s ability compared to outsiders. It may be diﬃcult for unknown young
scholars to convince other academics to read their papers. In such a case, one eﬀective
way to signal their ability and build reputation may be to work with established scholars.
Established scholars will be selective in choosing their co-authors as long as there is
residual uncertainty about senior scholar￿s ability as assumed in our model. As a result,
co-authorship with established scholars can be used to signal young scholar￿s ability even
when it would be diﬃcult to do on their own with single authorship. The following remark
from a Nobel laureate illustrates well our point:
￿... it clearly did my student... no harm at all to have me as a second author of the
paper. It called people￿s attention to the paper who might otherwise not [have] read it at
all... Nor as a matter of fact, did it do me any harm, even if I was heavily responsible for
it, to have him as co-author.￿ (Zuckerman, 1967, p.396)
16See Feenstra (1998).
276 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed a theory of reputation leverage in which the reputation of
an established ￿rm is used to help an unknown ￿r me s t a b l i s hi t so w nr e p u t a t i o nt h r o u g h
co-branding. The marketing literature points out an increasing popularity of co-branding
in the introduction of new consumer products in recent years and posits that the practice
plays a key role in changing consumers￿ perception that the two constituent products
will be regarded as being similar quality. Our model provides a micro-foundation of
the mechanism through which such a linkage in consumers￿ perception takes place and
identi￿es conditions under which co-branding is a superior signaling device of product
quality compared to pricing.
We believe that a similar leverage mechanism can be applied to a wide range of con-
texts that entail alliances of multiple parties, as we discussed in the previous section. Our
theory also suggests that in the formation of strategic alliances reputation can constitute
a key complementary asset that an established agent can bring to the table. We intend to
extend our framework to explain various types of partnerships and hope that our theory
shed light on the role of reputation in the formation of such alliances.
In particular, our perspective is useful to understand the role that brands of multina-
tional ￿rms play in the era of globalization. As the examples of our previous section illus-
trate, we can distinguish two types of leverage when reputation leverage occurs through
co-branding between a global brand and a local one. Either the co-branding leverages
the latter￿s reputation to the former (if the local brand enjoys high recognition and the
global brand is relatively unknown in the local context) and thereby helps the former to
penetrate local markets or it leverages the latter￿s reputation to the former. Through
the second type of leverage, globalization can bring important bene￿t to a local economy
which is poor in reputation capital. However, a multinational would be reluctant to lever-
age its reputation to a local ￿rm if it has an ambition to be a global player; in this case, it
might prefer outsourcing to co-branding. It would be interesting to study global brands￿
incentives to choose among diﬀerent strategies in penetrating local markets.
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